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Monarchy in Turmoil.

Princes, Courts, and Politics in Revolution and Restoration, 1780-1830

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A conference co-organised by Jeroen Duindam, Joost Welten, Quinten Somsen (Leiden University) and Joris Oddens (NL-Lab / Huygens ING)



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Speakers (alphabetical order) with paper titles and abstracts

Aston, Dr Nigel: Managing monarchy in a time of turbulence: Lord Salisbury as Lord Chamberlain at the court of George III, 1783-1804

Linda Colley famously acclaimed the later years of George III (immediately before and during the French Revolutionary Wars) as the king's apotheosis but the role of the royal household in creating the conditions in which the British monarchy might flourish has hardly been considered. This paper attempts to rectify that significant omission by looking at the role of the most senior courtier, the Lord Chamberlain of the Household, during the 1780s and 1790s, when the office was held continuously by James Cecil, 7th earl and 1st marquess of Salisbury (1748-1823). The Lord Chamberlainship had only just ceased to be ex officio a member of the Cabinet but it retained its inherent importance as a bridge between the king, the court, and the ministry. And, just as the appointment of Pitt the Younger as Premier in December 1783 would, in time, create the conditions in which stability would return to government so Salisbury's contemporaneous nomination to the Lord Chamberlainship would do the same for the court. It was a critical institutional and individual interlocking that helped the British state weather the turbulence of these two decades. This essay explores the ways in which Salisbury exercised his authority managing the household and his neglected part in personally managing George III as well as other members of the royal family. It emphasises the extent to which it was something of a husband-and-wife double act, for Salisbury's efforts and his influence were extended by his wife, Mary Amelia, a combative Pittite and vigorous rival to more celebrated Whig hostesses.

Dyrmann, Dr Kristine: Political sociability and women's agency at the Danish court, 1784–1797

This paper will examine female political agency at the Danish, absolutist court during what has been termed the reform reign, 1784–1797. The reform reign was inaugurated by a 1784 bloodless coup d'état, in which the crown prince took over power in the King's Privy Council. During the following years, his leading advisers faced opposition from other factions at court, and the French revolution with its ensuing wars created political turmoil on the continent. This paper focuses on a group of elite women from the leading families of the reign, who operated as political agents and partners in various political arenas outside of court. The court, however, remained the central sphere of power in the absolutist reign. The paper explores the attempts at seeking influence made by two wives of leading advisers to the royal crown prince, Frederik (6.), during the period in which their husbands functioned as the *de facto* ruler's advisers and ministers between 1784-1797. The presentation also identifies a number of the barriers that women could and did face in seeking to exercise political influence at court. I will argue that female influence at the absolutist, Danish court hinged on the presence of a female royal figure, and that the lack of such a leading, female figure as an avenue to power combined with changing ideals and political factions to pose a significant problem for the 'reform reign' women at court.

Emerick MA, Paige: Closer to the King?: Royal Visits and the Positioning of Courtiers, c.1789-1810

Royal progresses had traditionally been an integral part of court life, but the accession of the Hanoverian dynasty marked their decline in Britain as both George I and George II preferred to return to their native Hanover. Thereby with his accession in 1760, George III was presented with the opportunity to re-establish the conduct of royal visits, and his son, George IV, would expand upon his father's precedent by travelling more frequently and across greater distances to reside with his aristocratic friends. Through

focusing on George III's visits to Weymouth and George IV's (as Prince of Wales) progresses across northern England between c.1789-1810, this paper analyses how courtiers were able to use travel away from the traditional centre of political power to gain exclusive access to the royal person to befriend, influence, or push through their political beliefs. Given George III and George IV's personal and political opposition to each other, by collating which courtiers they resided with, the paper establishes the degree to which the choice of location and lodgings was divided upon Whig and Tory lines. Using private correspondence from these courtiers – including the Harcourts, Rutlands, and notable Privy Council members - the paper assesses how much courtiers were self-aware of the privileged private access they had to the royal family and the ways in which they acted on this for their own benefit. This comparison of circles around George III and George IV reveals how courtiers utilised royal visits to favourably position themselves and seek political advantage.

Getka-Kenig, Dr Mikołaj: The Royal Court and the Politics of Monarchical Image in Romanov Poland, 1815-30

The Kingdom of Poland or Congress Poland (1815-30), established by the Congress of Vienna according to the wishes of the Russian tsar Alexander I, was a political experiment. The constitutional monarchy of 'resurrected' Poland, building on the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, gave the Romanovs an opportunity to embrace a moderate liberal system as a model for the planned reform of Russia. The new regime was expected to marry autocracy with modern royal constitutionalism. However, it hardly responded to the deep-seated Polish republican identity and the tradition of general mistrust towards royalty.

While the course of consequent political conflicts which marred this short-lived period in Polish-Russian relations is well-known to historians, there is still a lot to say about the Kingdom's official propaganda. This under-researched subject provides us with a new perspective on the political history of the Kingdom, since it moves our attention from researching the inevitable (the regime's failure) towards the analysis of how the regime endeavoured to persist. This paper focuses on the one specific and little known institution of the Kingdom's royal image-making, namely the royal court in Warsaw. Although a court had existed already in the Commonwealth, the Kingdom invented a new royal court, closely imitating its Russian counterpart in terms of hierarchy and titles. While its direct archival records are scarce (since most of the Kingdom's archival legacy perished in 1944), the Kingdom's court and courtiers were often described in contemporary press, diaries and memoires, as well as in official documents concerning the Romanovs' presence in Poland.

While the emperor-kings were ordinarily based in Petersburg, their Warsaw court permanently represented their authority in the Kingdom. It was a symbol of the latter's nominal independence from Russia (but also of the union between both states). Simultaneously, it also served to strengthen the relationship between the Romanovs and the post-republican elite. Especially the sons and daughters of the Kingdom's ministers and senators were presented with courtly titles. Their active participation in royal ceremonies expressed the idea of national devotion and allegiance to monarchy. This was especially evident during the Warsaw coronation of Nicholas I in 1829, when the new monarch unsuccessfully tried to secure the Romanov succession. The coronation marked the apogee of the court's public prominence, since the ceremony's aim was to underscore the centrality of monarchy for 'resurrected' Poles.

Godsey, Dr William: Courtiers and High Politics in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era (1792-1815)

The conventional interpretation has held that by the later 18th century court and government in the Habsburg Monarchy had diverged. In this view, the great court dignitaries, such as the *Obersthofmeister*, who had previously been key political actors, were reduced largely to 'ceremonial' functions within the ruler's household. In part due to this interpretive perspective little attention has been paid to the problem of court and politics in succeeding periods. This paper will attempt to answer two related questions. First, what was the profile of the 12 holders of the four leading court offices (*Obersthofmeister* [grand master of the court], *Oberstkämmerer* [grand chamberlain], *Obersthofmarschall* [grand marshal of the court] and *Oberststallmeister* [grand equerry]) between the accession of the emperor Francis II in 1792 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815? In answering this question attention will be given to family backgrounds and connections, career paths, and relations to the ruling dynasty and ministers. In particular the paper will argue for the centrality of diplomacy, foreign policy, and the traditional areas of Habsburg great power aspirations in the appointment of these dignitaries during the crisis of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period. Second, what political role did these dignitaries actually play? Count Colloredo, Prince Trauttmansdorff, and Count Wrbnna are figures that will be spotlighted in trying to answer this second question.

Haegle, Dr Vincent: Joseph Bonaparte and the royal households of Naples and Spain

When Joseph Bonaparte became King of Naples by the force of weapons, he needed to legitimize his regime, while at the same time he wanted to profoundly reforming Neapolitan society. Paradoxically, this revolution, mainly directed against feudalism, cultivated continuity: Joseph put an end to the reign of the Bourbons of Naples, yet he maintained a decorum rooted in traditions to rally the liberal elites largely drawn from the aristocracy. The monarchical institutional framework, notably including the court, was indispensable: it linked the crown and the people. Joseph constituted a household along the lines of that of the old regime. However, in his distribution of charges he sought to establish a balance between the French who accompanied him -- some of his closest advisers among them - and the Neapolitans who rallied to his flag. His court would be the antechamber of government rather than a podium for monarchical pomp. For two years, a kind of balance was preserved. When Joseph became King of Spain in 1808, he aimed to transfer his successful Neapolitan formula, but his effort could not succeed there. The Madrid court was a mere shadow, like the demi-regime that Joseph embodied; however, it served as a target for the opposition, which depicted Joseph's court as the antechamber of treachery and foreign meddling. These contrasting experiences show that the court of the Napoleonic era is full of contradictions.

Horowski, Dr Leonhard: 'Wir haben kein Gouvernement': Ministers, aristocrats and the problem of central government in Prussia, 1786-1822

In a letter written in early September 1806, Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia named the crucial political defect that made him despair of his country, and would be a major cause of his own violent death only six weeks later. In the prince's view and that of most of his contemporaries, Prussia had entered a war against Napoleon without allies and preparation only because it lacked a functional decision-making mechanism at the top. While this absence turned out to be catastrophic, it was arguably also the

consequence of almost a century of conscious state-building, and by no means a purely Prussian oddity either; characteristically, when the Prince wrote the sentence quoted in this paper's title (which translates to „We have no government“), the lack of even a German word for the missing institution forced him to employ a French term which itself had only recently taken on this meaning. Yet its time had clearly come. Once the catastrophic defeat of October 1806 had brought down ‚Old Prussia‘, its painful reconstruction from scratch would be dominated by the quest for an integrated supreme institution of government that was conceptually distinguishable from the monarch, his entourage and the vague collective of his superior administrative, courtly and military ‚servants‘ („hohe Staats-, Hof- und Kriegs-Bediente“).

My paper will therefore consist of two parts. In the first part, I shall give a short overview of the institutional organisation and history of Old Prussia during its last twenty years before then sketching the development of ministerial office and central institutions during the post-1806 reform years. In doing so, I will discuss crucial developments up to 1822, when the death of State Chancellor Prince Hardenberg ended Prussia's prime ministerial experiment and left it with a dual system of king and cabinet not untypical for 19th century monarchies. In the second part, I will then try to demonstrate how traditional interpretations of this much-discussed process as radical modernisation ultimately stunted by reactionary forces misses at least one important dimension of the changes. In describing the little-known but crucial importance of ministerial office and rank for the equally little-known pre-1806 Prussian court aristocracy, I aim to show how the resurgence of institutionalised ministerial power during the reform era was also the reconquest of institutionalised power by an élite group within the nobility. While the ministers of ‚Old Prussia‘ lacked the unified locus of power which the existence of a cabinet provided to their British counterparts, they had gradually become the structural core of an increasingly exclusive social collective. By the end of the 18th century, this aristocratic collective included not only almost all top administrators, but the entire court élite and crucial military commanders as well – a group, in other words, whose claim to power came to look more and more legitimate as hapless kings aided by socially subaltern secretaries appeared to manoeuvre the country onto the brink of destruction. The catastrophe of 1806 was their chance to succeed as much as that of the few radical modernisers, and ultimately they won.

Mansel, Dr Philip: Powers behind the Throne: French Courtiers and Politics, from Talleyrand to Jules de Polignac, 1804-1830

In Napoleon's ultra-personal monarchy, court officials like Berthier, Talleyrand and Caulaincourt were also ministers, with considerable political influence, especially in 1814. Under Louis XVIII and Charles X, when power also lay with the two Chambers, court officials had less influence. The only complete reform in the French court's history took place in 1820, against the court's opposition. It was instituted by the Duc de Richelieu, a former Premier Gentilhomme de la Chambre who owed his position as President du Conseil not to his court office but to his personal reputation and the favour of Alexander I of Russia.

Two court officials, however, did play a political role: the comte de Blacas, Grand Maitre de la Garderobe under Louis XVIII after 1809 and Ministre de la Maison in 1814-15; and Jules de Polignac, favourite ADC of Charles X, and President du Conseil in 1829-30. Blacas supported the 1814 Charte. Polignac, however, counter-signed the Ordonnances of 26 July 1830 restricting the Charte, despite the opposition of most court officials, including Polignac's brother. The Ordonnances led to the July Revolution, the end of the Restoration and the abolition of the traditional Maison du Roi.

Mehrkens, Dr Heidi: The Diamond Duke and his court. Competing for power in the Duchy of Brunswick (1815-1830)

A revolutionary uprising on 7 September 1830 ended the reign of Charles II, the rather eccentric Duke of Brunswick (1804-1873). When angry citizens set fire to the ducal residence in the capital, the young ruler escaped, though he never regained his throne and died in exile. While it is true that the *Diamond Duke* (as Charles became known due to his taste for exquisite jewellery) was targeted personally and the revolutionaries respected the monarchical tradition and lineage by swiftly installing his brother William on the throne, this paper argues that the events of 1830 also resulted from a period of decreasing political stability at the ducal court. ***Relations with the local nobility, already strained over the complex legal issue of Charles's majority, eroded further when the duke finally came to power in 1823. In the following years, failure on behalf of the ruler to communicate and compromise, but also conflict over administrative positions, severely disrupted processes of political decision making. The talk will present the case of Justus von Schmidt-Phiseldeck who, in charge of Brunswick's state affairs, fled to Hannover in 1826 and was legally pursued by the duke. Culminating in the events of September 1830, Brunswick presents a unique case where a court and its administrative elites did not incite revolution but seized the opportunity to abandon their ruler and create a *fait accompli* with international repercussions for decades to come.

Mormile MA, Maria Sofia: From Turin to Britain : the "sacrée coterie" of the comte d'Artois between personal challenge and political isolation (1789-1807)

The paper will shed light on the role played by the entourage of the Comte d'Artois - the future Charles X - during his emigration and exile. Focusing on a few key figures (such as the Comte de Vaudreuil, intimate of the Duchesse de Polignac and Artois's undisputed confidant; the Baron de Roll, once second-in-command of Artois's Swiss regiment; the Duc de Sérent, former tutor of Artois's children; the Duc de Bourbon, Artois's cousin and son of the Prince de Condé) it will be argued how this group influenced Artois's political thought and action from the moment he left France in 1789. At first, the entourage supported and participated in Artois' intention to end the Revolution through military force. The group was at Artois's side in Turin, when, along with the Prince de Condé, he conceived the scheme of a princely counter-revolution to be operated with the support of the high nobility and with the help of foreign armies and then followed him in the Empire's territories. The members of the entourage promoted the role of Artois as 'saviour' but de facto rival and opponent of Louis XVI, whose behaviour, perceived as ineffective and weak, allowed Artois to claim a leading political role. The entourage was involved in the diplomatic and military effort that the princes put together, particularly through the Armée de Condé, thereby adapting to the unusual situation that emigration provided, which also allowed them to play different roles from those they had in pre-revolutionary society. However, as the princes' plans repeatedly failed and the European cabinets tended to compromise with revolutionary France, the entourage changed its attitude. Following Artois in his last, failed attempt to conquer France via Brittany in 1795 (expédition de l'Île d'Yeu), they strongly advised him to return to Britain and accept the security - but also the constraints - of George III's hospitality. In the following years, the entourage adopted an increasingly protective agenda, discouraging political action and compromise and contributing to Artois's social and political isolation. This fueled his idea of a possible, if 'adjusted', return to the Ancien Régime, which would have major consequences for his reign (1824-1830).

Persson, Dr Fabian: Personal Power in Personal Rule: Female Courtiers in Sweden 1770 to 1830

The survival of royal courts as centres of power into the modern age has been hard to square with the view of power growing ever more bureaucratic and impersonal. The continued importance of women at courts at the cusp of the modern era emphasizes this even more clearly. In Sweden, as in other places, there were several ways in which female courtiers could assert influence, but these ways were highly dependable on the monarch and thus varied in importance between reigns. While a line of mistresses in the 1730s and 1740s were of importance, royal mistresses were largely unimportant during the reign of Gustaf III who showed little interest in acquiring such female companions. However, Gustaf III was highly in favour of being surrounded by a circle of aristocratic women of high rank and exquisite courtly manners. His introduction of the office of Ladies of the Palace (*statsfruor*) in 1774 created a permanent institutional framework for these women. Many of them wielded influence and were seen as integral to the fortunes of their husbands and families. In the 1810s and 1820s the Ladies of the Palace continued to wield influence and social power, though they were overshadowed by the resurgence of a royal mistress in the form of Mariana Koskull. Once again, the quickly shifting tectonic plates of personal relationships influenced royal personal rule.

Seaward, Dr Paul: 'Levées in the morning, circles in the evening, dinners and what not': the management of parliament and the soft power of the late Hanoverian monarchy

This paper will explore the direct engagement of the monarchy and the royal court with the British parliament, mainly in the reigns of George IV and William IV, from 1820 to 1837. Numerous royal courtiers and intimates of the monarch and his close relations sat in either house of parliament, and the engagement of parliament and monarchy is usually seen in terms of the extent to which royal household officials were expected to support the government's line. But in what other ways did the link they formed between parliament and the king relate to and complicate the relationship between the king and his formal ministers? How did courtiers pursue the personal interests of the crown? And more broadly, to what extent did the monarch seek to personally cultivate a relationship with members of parliament, or directly follow the proceedings in parliament?

Somsen, MA, Quinten: 'When the great and little ones suppress each other in the antechamber': the Court in a Republican and 'Monarchical' setting (c. 1780-1806)

This paper compares the role of the court in two very different political contexts: the Landgraviate of Hesse-Kassel and the Republic of the Seven United Provinces. The exceptional wealth of Landgrave Wilhelm IX of Hesse-Kassel (r. 1785-1821) strengthened his central bureaucracy at the expense of the indebted territorial estates. Stadholder Willem V (t. 1766-1795), conversely, did not preside over a well-organised central bureaucracy and yet he had to navigate a much more complex representative system with autonomous town governments and seven provincial assemblies, which – ultimately – decided the vote in the States-General. The landgrave's preponderance was expressed through grand architectural projects and a larger household, but did this make his court more important? My findings point in another direction.

The representative and confederate structure of the Dutch Republic made the court a crucial centre of personal interaction, informal politics, and patronage. Whereas the landgrave was able to retreat behind his writing desk and limit social interaction to a few court receptions a week, the stadholder was

overwhelmed by visitors who flocked to the palace to speak to him. In Hesse-Kassel, decision-making took place in the council and the landgrave tried to limit the circle of ministers and advisors, whereas political authority was distributed over a broader ruling elite in the Dutch Republic. Maintaining relations with stakeholders was a complex affair for the stadholder. Court life, as a consequence, was an uninterrupted cycle of social interaction, which dominated political culture and decision-making in the late-eighteenth century Dutch Republic.

Trétout, Dr Thibaut: 'Entre Chambres et antichambres': The political dimension of the French Court during the (second) Restauration

According to the caricatures produced by its detractors from the time of the Restoration onwards, adorned with the colours of truth after “the Three Glorious” Days, the Bourbon court of France would be nothing but anachronistic and ridiculous. This retrospective condemnation prevents us from understanding the centrality of royal Households and court society in France between 1814 and 1830. The Restoration court had a clear political dimension, as a means to legitimize the hereditary principle embodied by the ruling dynasty, to glorify their prominence and to stage the scenario of a sacred monarchy. Ministers needed to take into account the court, either by seeking its support or by circumventing its opposition. Forced to come to terms with courtiers and, sometimes despite themselves, to act as courtiers, the ministers of the Restoration could rule only by taking into account the power of influence the court, even during sessions of the Assemblies or during the elections. Having resisted attempts at its nationalization envisaged by the reform of November 1820, the court turned into a coterie of courtiers increasingly alien to the people of France and hostile to liberties – a nuisance power more than a unifying force.

Tricoire, Prof.dr Damien: An aristocratic fronde? The “machine d’Orléans” and the origins of the French Revolution (1788-1789)

Who stormed the Bastille? This apparently simple question has been rarely asked because the answer is usually assumed to be “the people”. However, specialists know that the Bastille was taken by professional soldiers, and recent scholarship suggests that there may be a direct link between this action and the faction gathered around Louis-Philippe II Joseph d’Orléans, a cousin of King Louis XVI. Before that, as George Kelly has shown, Orléans’ councilors created a propaganda machine, sometimes named the “machine d’Orléans”, in order to call for the gathering of the Estates General, and inspire and legitimate opposition. There are serious hints that they not only encouraged, but also coordinated many oppositional activities in 1788-1789.

By exploring these phenomena that are neglected in historiography, this paper aims to develop new perspectives on the outbreak of the French Revolution. Its hypothesis is that the events of the spring and early summer of 1789 were much more similar to seventeenth-century aristocratic frondes than has been acknowledged. I seek to re-assess the role of Orléans and his entourage in inspiring and leading the opposition before and at the beginning of the French Revolution, and I will especially explore the way leading members of the Orléans court – his chancellor Ducrest and Choderlos de Laclos – endeavored to foster oppositional activities in order to put pressure on leading court factions (for example on the king’s brother Artois and queen Marie-Antoinette). The links between political writers and Orléans’ entourage will be of special interest.

A major question of late eighteenth-century French history is why Orléans protected increasingly radical authors, and finally chose open revolt, and even revolution. Strategies to maintain the social status of his family will be of special interest. Orléans's social standing was indeed threatened in the 1780s because Louis XVI and his brother had produced legitimate sons, which meant in the medium term the impending loss of the vast appanage (10% of French territory) and elevated status of the lesser branches of the Bourbons.

It is improbable that Orléans and his entourage had in mind a revolution leading to the holds of a wholly new political order before the spring or even summer 1789. The monarchical "légende noire" of Orléans, which claims that he plotted to take the French throne away from his cousin, is unconvincing. My claim is rather that Orléans and his entourage followed largely established patterns of aristocratic opposition, and that this opposition made sense in the framework of fights between court factions and of court structures. The outbreak of the French Revolution cannot be understood without a more complete analysis of court history.

Vial, Dr Charles-Éloi: Charles X and his court: politics and fidelity during the July Revolution

History is generally written by winners and the July Revolution is more frequently studied from the point of view of the Hôtel de Ville or the Palais-Royal, but Charles X's court has played an important role during the year 1830, from the signature of the five « ordonnances » to his departure from France in Cherbourg. Some of Charles X's close courtiers had a political opinion, many of them were frankly against the government but still loyal to the king himself, or to his dynasty. In the troubled time of the July revolution, some of them remembered that they had a political or military past, and played a role of advice and protection, especially during the hazardous moments in the castle of Rambouillet, where the king had to abdicate. Some others went back to Paris and tried to play a role in the Deputy or the Peers Chambers, but they ultimately had to agree with the « Orléans » solution. Those who remained with the king took part in the court life in exile, and still served the Bourbons in Scotland and later in Prague. Some archives about this very particular moment are still awaiting study, especially the correspondence of Louis-Philippe himself, some of the Thiers and Barante archives at the BnF, and several correspondences and notes held either in the Bibliothèque municipale de Versailles, or in the Archives des Affaires étrangères.

Welten, Dr Joost: King William I of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands as a patron (1813-1830)

In a constitutional monarchy, in which new legislation requires the approval of an assembly of elected representatives, the balance of power is definitively in favour of the representatives of the people. This characterisation seems pre-eminently applicable to the reign of William I, King of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. It seems that the court only had a secondary role to play, e.g. in the area of representation. Analysis of attendance lists at the king's audiences and of guest lists at dinners and balls at court, however, shows a different picture. Almost the entire social and political elite was present at court celebrations, while every year thousands of other people took the trouble to speak to the king in person at an audience. Whereas the settlement of collective agreements had become the domain of parliament, the interests of the individual, family, company or association could better be pursued via the King. Not only did he appoint every officer in the army and navy, every senior civil servant, provincial governor, mayor, diplomat and court representative, the king also had at his disposal a - for Dutch standards - huge amount of money that he was free to spend. Part of it went to the needy among his clientele, but another significant part went to projects he considered economically desirable.

In a traditional view of “monarchical absolutism”, a Royal family is needed foremost for the survival of the dynasty. Dynasty and court are expected to provide the splendor for Royal ceremonies. Accordingly, members of the Royal family are seen as personal and ceremonial surroundings of the monarch. Recent research has already shown that there may be more to the court than representation only. But for the families, the picture is still in need of additions. The paper will examine the role of Hohenzollern family members during the era of European war, domestic reform, and “restauration”, looking specifically at Queen Louise and the princes and later kings Frederick William IV and William I, respectively their brothers and sisters. I will ask whether there was a special notion of “the political” in familial perceptions of events. Contempt of Napoleon and the French seems to be a distinctive characteristic. Did the political mind of the Hohenzollern family concern questions of war and peace and domestic politics like the Prussian Reforms? When and how were princes or princesses addressed by other political actors (ministers, nobles) asking for support, and how did family members respond to these requests? Was there any kind of – however limited - political influence apart from functions like the later Frederick William IV serving at the “Kronprinzenkommission”? The paper will show that even in Prussia, a more substantial role of the Royal family in the monarchical system of the “bourgeois age” was well under way.