

Checklist for Collaboration with Chinese Universities and Other Research Institutions

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INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATION

In recent years there has been an upsurge in cooperation between universities and other research institutions in China and counterparts in the rest of the world. Due to China's rapid rise on the world stage, many institutions are keen to forge links with Chinese partners. According to a Chinese report published in January 2018, approximately 443,000 foreign students were studying in China in 2016.¹ In 2017 about 608,400 Chinese students went abroad to study: 11.7% more than in 2016.² There are currently around 200 partnership agreements between Dutch and Chinese centres of learning, and more students come from China to study in the Netherlands than from any other non-EU country.³ In many ways, this cooperation epitomises the involvement of the Global South in international academic research, tapping into a potential wealth of new insight and understanding.

However, like other emerging powers in the past, China is not necessarily interested in academic research as such, but rather regards it as a significant factor in shaping the country's rise. China's research aims are largely linked to its political and strategic ambitions, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Made in China 2025 plan launched in 2016 to make China a technology superpower.

This background should be borne in mind when considering potential and actual partnerships with Chinese universities and other research institutions. It is vital to weigh the advantages against possible risks. Particular attention should be paid to the following:

1. **Setting the agenda.** Chinese centres of learning do their homework diligently. They know very well whom they want to work with and why. Their cooperation agenda derives from the strategic policy formulated by their government. If the Dutch partner does not have a clear aim and/or lacks knowledge about its prospective or current partner, it is highly likely that in the end it will give more than it gets.
2. **Academic freedom.** On the Chinese side, the operating principle is not 'science for science's sake'. Research almost always has to serve an ulterior economic and/or political motive or aim. This means that the Chinese research community takes a different approach to academic freedom and intellectual property than is customary in Europe. Ethical norms may diverge. Sometimes joint results are used politically in a way that from a Dutch perspective seems improper.
3. **Knowledge transfer.** In the research areas that China is focusing on – such as engineering, AI, robotics, 5G, space and aerospace – scientific knowledge and applied knowledge (technology) are closely linked, particularly as China sees them. Cooperation could mean an undesirable transfer of science and technology to China, harming the competitive position of European companies. It could also endanger or directly damage national security interests.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) has worked in close cooperation with the Leiden Asia Centre (LAC) on an extensive study mapping the risks and challenges of academic and research collaboration with Chinese partners. To this end, the LAC and HCSS conducted over 40 interviews with scientists and university staff in the Netherlands and abroad who have first-hand experience of working with China. Research was also conducted in Poland, Germany and Denmark, and various Chinese researchers were interviewed. Besides at academic institutions, inquiries were pursued at Brainport Eindhoven and among the Dutch security services. An extensive literature review was also carried out.

The outcomes of the HCSS/LAC joint study include the checklist below, which is designed to support policymakers and decision-makers involved in potential or actual cooperation with Chinese universities and other research institutions by helping them to assess the risks and potential limitations. The aim is not to discourage cooperation but rather to enhance its added value for the Netherlands. In general, Chinese counterparts will have asked themselves similar questions as a means of shaping partnerships in line with their own ideas.

CHECKLIST OF 10 QUESTIONS WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. Why work with a partner from China rather than another country?

In view of the potentially serious limitations and risks that collaboration with Chinese parties can involve, it is useful to examine whether the desired results can be more easily achieved elsewhere. There are substantive considerations: is the integrity of the shared data at stake and can researchers operate freely? There are also possible procedural issues: is it easy to get visas? Is screening required? Are financial transactions guaranteed? Such considerations may lead to the conclusion that collaboration with European partners will ultimately prove more worthwhile.

Opinion is divided about the merits of working with Chinese academic institutions. The interviewees in the HCSS/LAC joint study frequently mention that China is the second-largest research and academic exchange partner (after the United States) for Dutch and other European parties. This is underlined by the notion that in the future, China could become the most significant player on the global academic scene.⁴ With 250,000 publications in international research journals annually, China is now the second-largest source of research literature after the United States, with 300,000 publications.⁵ The Chinese government is investing substantial sums in research, and research collaboration between the Netherlands and China is growing. Between 2010 and 2015 the Netherlands ranked tenth in the list of major contributors to Chinese academic publications.⁶ Yet at the same time, the HCSS/LAC study notes that neither the Netherlands nor Europe in general has a clear strategy for research collaboration with China on which to base frameworks for what should and should not be included in future agreements.⁷

Collaboration with Chinese institutions is motivated by many different factors. For example, it enables Western parties to get to know China better. Sources in Germany even claim that partnerships of this kind help 'strengthen Germany as a research and innovation location' and 'find solutions to the great social and environmental challenges of our time'.⁸ Danish sources note that a great deal of knowledge production will take place in China in the future.⁹ Collaboration with a Chinese university may also make it easier to do certain kinds of clinical research, for instance involving animals. In addition, the opportunity to work with

much larger population samples is a frequently quoted reason for doing research in China.¹⁰

Not everyone is convinced that working with Chinese institutions yields greater added value than collaboration with more traditional partners closer to home. Language barriers and cultural differences are frequently cited as factors that hinder collaboration. In addition, the availability of funding cannot always be taken for granted. It is frequently pointed out that the agenda of potential Chinese partners is often insufficiently transparent.¹¹ On one occasion, differences of opinion on how to conduct the research prevented collaboration between a Dutch academic and industrial partner and a party in China from getting off the ground. Another researcher contended, 'We give more to China than we get'.¹²

Chinese researchers engage with European and other Western partners to gain access to high-grade knowledge. On the other hand, a Chinese scientist has accused Western institutions of educational 'dumping', particularly in business education, where branches are opened in China for financial gain.¹³

2. What is the partnership's aim?

It is wise to formulate your own goals for the partnership and then consider whether they can be achieved in practice. Which factors determine success or failure? Is there a risk that certain activities could be blocked by the Chinese partner for political or strategic reasons, or might have to be designed differently? Are your aims and objectives in line with national or regional policy guidelines? Is there a reasonable chance that the envisaged aims will still be intact at the end of the project? Are the aims on the Chinese side known and understood and can they be reconciled with your own?

Western countries usually formulate the aims of their collaboration with Chinese academic parties in purely academic and/or commercial terms. For academic institutions in Denmark, for instance, 'creating knowledge and innovation' is a key aim. Another aim is to attract Chinese talent to Danish companies.¹⁴ In the Netherlands, it is also claimed that China simply has top researchers with whom we should want to work.¹⁵ In addition, parties want access to funding, infrastructure, specific equipment and data, although there may be a range of restrictions attached to all of these.¹⁶ All things considered, it is difficult to generate value unless the partnership's form and content have been clearly

formulated beforehand. So it is vital to be aware to what extent the two sides' interests are balanced and compatible. Are there likely to be any fundamental concerns or objections from the Chinese side, which could negatively impact your own objectives, or the other way round?

From the Chinese viewpoint, getting citations is a key incentive, since they are crucial to obtaining promotion in China, and a lack of them can even result in 'social exclusion'. Because this is such a sensitive issue, it can be conducive to fraud.¹⁷ This can have very serious personal consequences for Chinese researchers.¹⁸ Affirmation of personal status – which in turn enhances China's position in the world – is an additional motivation. Thus, obtaining honorary doctorates becomes a goal in its own right. Prestige is also attached to joint publications, in which it is highly desirable for the Chinese researcher's name to be mentioned as first author.¹⁹ In addition, the threat of curtailing or cancelling existing partnerships may be used to stop foreign universities from inviting speakers such as the Dalai Lama, who are viewed by the Chinese authorities as undesirable. This was the case at the University of California San Diego in 2017.²⁰

Another Chinese goal is the acquisition of knowledge considered necessary for the country's further development. Accordingly, besides interest in materials science and the advancement of medicine, there is a desire to find efficient ways to run pension funds and medical insurance schemes.²¹

3. What form will the partnership take?

What parties are directly or indirectly involved in the partnership? Will any third parties be joining at a later stage who could demand a particular role or a stake? What contribution could they make to the factors that determine success or failure in achieving the objectives? What are the options for monitoring this?

Partnership agreements with Chinese institutions may arise from individual contacts, but are generally formalised. Many of these agreements are based around student exchange, especially at master's and doctoral level.²² However, there appears to be an imbalance between the numbers of outgoing and incoming students, given that far more Chinese come to Europe than the other

way round. There are various explanations for this. The fact that courses are taught in English and credit points need to be recognised by the home institution are stumbling blocks for many Europeans, but not for the Chinese. Certain universities in Europe (including the Netherlands) are currently even restricting the number of incoming students from China.²³ The majority of Chinese students come to Europe to study natural sciences.

This shows that partnerships with Chinese universities and research institutions are not always on an equal footing, and are often more advantageous for the Chinese partners. This may be due to inequalities in funding opportunities, the freedom to do research, the number of students involved, or the category of researcher eligible to take part in certain exchange programmes. Chinese researchers working in Europe often have much better access to data than Europeans working in China. In addition, Western researchers are sometimes required to have a doctorate from a Western university, whereas no such requirement is imposed on Chinese academics.²⁴

4. Who will fund the partnership, and how will this affect the partners' rights, obligations and responsibilities?

'He who pays the piper calls the tune.' It is important to know who will fund the project – directly or indirectly. This is particularly true when working with a country like China, where the government plays a major role not only as the financier but also in directly or (more often) indirectly shaping the partnership's content and form. Between the lines of the formulated and agreed objectives, there may also be other, implicit objectives. An agreement that leaves room for interpretation can cause friction at a later stage.

It is unclear to what extent collaboration with Chinese institutions also implies access to their funding sources. Although European parties regularly mention funding as a reason for entering into partnership with China, it is also reported that China makes no direct funding available for projects in, for instance, Europe, and that similarly, no euros find their way to China.²⁵ In addition, joint programme funding often appears not to involve any money actually changing hands.²⁶ For example, it would not be legally possible to fund a facility for a Dutch university in China.²⁷

There are known cases where funding from the Chinese side has been used to lay claim to the research findings, or as leverage for the Chinese partners to set the agenda.²⁸ For example, one Chinese partner claimed a 51% share in the development of intellectual property in a partnership with a Dutch university.²⁹

5. Can all partners access and use the findings of the joint research?

Research findings may represent different stakes for the various parties involved. It is therefore vital to know what can be done with the findings in terms of publication or sharing with third parties, so that none of the partners can unexpectedly veto a decision.

Because Chinese and foreign (e.g. Dutch) partners often each fund their 'own' part of the partnership, they are generally free to benefit from the exchange programmes, education and research that it entails. Nevertheless, it is reported that in China, certain research outcomes can be used for political purposes, and that there are actual examples of this happening.³⁰ Also, a Chinese partner may lay claim to a particular type of ownership rights, especially if the joint activities fall under Chinese jurisdiction. Another reported example of Chinese practice concerns doctoral dissertations facilitated by Chinese government funding: the authors were required to submit their data and dissertations to their institute for scrutiny before these could be published in foreign academic journals. Whenever international cooperation requires sharing secret data, the Chinese organisation must follow a set procedure and the partner must sign a non-disclosure agreement.³¹

6. Do the participants understand the potential risks and know about precautions that have been taken or need to be taken?

Are staff fully aware of the specific risks of working with Chinese parties? Are there any regulations or protocols they need to know about?

There are major disparities in researchers' awareness and understanding of the risks of interaction with Chinese peers. The HCSS/LAC joint study interviews appear to show a difference between scientists and scholars in the humanities: on average, the former tend to be more sceptical than the latter. Previous experience and in some cases individual political preferences also affect what precautions researchers take. One interviewee contended that some researchers actually *do not want* to acknowledge the risks.³²

In general, researchers with experience in China say that Western institutions have not built up sufficient awareness of the risks of working with Chinese partners. This should begin with asking about the source of funding, regardless of whether Dutch researchers will ultimately receive any of it. Agencies like the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) are extremely cautious in their approach. For instance, they do not admit Chinese partners to projects that develop new technology. All TNO staff are subjected to the same security checks, with extra vigilance towards employees who pose specific risks.

The existence of protocols varies a great deal. Organisations like TNO have them, but many universities do not. In general, few questions are asked about practical matters, such as how to deal with nationalist student associations, how to respond to requests for censorship, and what to do if students complain that the subject content is unfair to China. These are issues that universities and research institutions should devote more attention to, especially if exchange schemes with China grow in size and China continues to take an assertive course.

7. Can restrictions on academic freedom be expected?

Doing research with Chinese partners may place certain restrictions on academic freedom. These may relate to content, for instance not mentioning the 3 Ts (Tibet, Tiananmen and Taiwan). Or accepting that Chinese partners may want to actively control certain 'narratives' (giving rise to a tension between intellectual integrity and indoctrination) for instance by wanting to foreground the role played by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in historical research.

Academic freedom can be jeopardised in various ways. For instance, certain subjects or people may be excluded at the start of a joint project. Once the project is under way, researchers or students may find themselves under pressure to modify or scrap their results. The general impression is that government direction of the academic sector has increased significantly under President Xi Jinping, and that academic freedom has clearly diminished. Foreign academics working in China are obliged to sign contracts in which they pledge

not to reveal any Chinese ‘state secrets’. The problem is that the term ‘state secret’ is open to interpretation.³³

Restrictions on academic freedom derive from the Chinese government’s way of dealing with Chinese academics. A German study asserted, ‘The most important challenges to Chinese-German cooperation are the restricted freedom of science in China, distorting incentive schemes for Chinese scientists, [and] lack of transparency in government decisions [...]’.³⁴ In 2015 Chinese minister of education Yuan Guiren banned the promotion of ‘Western values’ in Chinese classrooms. According to the media, such values include the ‘universalist’ perspective on human rights and narrow definitions of constitutional democracy. Comments that could be construed as ‘slandering the leadership of the communist party’ or ‘smearing socialism’ are not to be tolerated. In summary, the Chinese ministry of education appears to be tightening up its monitoring of philosophy education and the social sciences, and promoting an approach ‘with Chinese characteristics’.³⁵

This approach to academic freedom in China is sometimes practised abroad as well. For instance, various Chinese universities are actively creating overseas ‘party cells’ or ‘party groups’.³⁶ Chinese academics have set up a Communist ‘party branch’ at the University of California Davis in order ‘to continue to recruit new members; organise the group to study the latest party theory and ideology from China; resist the corrosive influence from the west; and enable the members of the branch office and other Chinese patriotic people to experience warm caring from the party office’.³⁷

This policy is perhaps most conspicuously exemplified by the Confucius Institutes, which have sparked off a number of controversial incidents worldwide. In the American city of Chicago, for example, the local Confucius Institute was at the centre of a scandal and closed down in 2014 after a disagreement between the University of Chicago and a senior executive at Hanban, the Chinese government agency that provides Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide. In the same year, Pennsylvania State University closed down its Confucius Institute.³⁸ One problem with these institutes is that the Chinese ministry of education is responsible for recruiting staff. Another is that these members of staff do not have the same academic freedom

as Western academics.³⁹ McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada, closed the affiliated Confucius Institute after staff expressed concerns about the policy that employees were not allowed to have ties with organisations banned by the Chinese government. One of the institute's teachers, who was also a practitioner of Falun Gong, stated that she had been put under pressure to hide her beliefs. The director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service said that 'lobbyists are funding Confucius Institutes in most of the campuses across Canada; the institutes are managed by people operating out of the embassy or consulates – nobody knows that the Chinese authorities are involved' and that 'they had organised demonstrations to deal with what are called the five poisons: Taiwan, Falun Gong and others'.⁴⁰ The Chinese once presented a proposal to set up a Confucius Institute in Utrecht. The proposal was rejected by the Executive Board of Utrecht University.⁴¹

For researchers, the most immediate problem is censorship in direct interaction. The interviews produced several examples of this. For instance, during a stay in China, representatives of a Dutch university received an 'urgent request' to modify the subject of a 'moot court' hearing – a simulation exercise for law students. In another incident, certain pages of a textbook were glued shut because they contained information considered sensitive by China. Cases were also reported in which European researchers discovered that the freedom of speech of Chinese students (in China) had evidently been curtailed.⁴² In Denmark and the Netherlands there were reports of a party cell at certain universities.⁴³ The aim of such cells is to keep Chinese students on 'the right ideological path'. A cell leader is reported to have said that he 'was protecting his fellow students with a view to their return to China' and wondered if a Dutch university would have any objections.⁴⁴ Students at Utrecht University are said to have been 'mobilised' by the Chinese government to hand in a petition to the International Court of Justice in The Hague in protest at its South China Sea ruling.⁴⁵ In addition, it is reported that certain literature is unavailable in China, internet connections are unreliable, classrooms sometimes have camera surveillance, and areas such as Xinjiang are not accessible to researchers.

Self-censorship is also an issue. In a public setting, European and other Western researchers working in China rarely make critical comments about Chinese politics. One researcher described this as a matter of 'courtesy'.⁴⁶ In another

case, a researcher refrained from mentioning the ‘Tiananmen protests’, and instead referred to the ‘time of protests’. Chinese researchers are also reined in ideologically by memos from the CPC and ‘refresher courses on party regulations’.⁴⁷

Another issue concerns fake peer reviews, fabrication of data and plagiarism in Chinese academia. These problems are usually a result of the combination of low academic salaries and high bonuses paid for publishing in journals.⁴⁸ For Chinese researchers and students the issue of restricted academic freedom is particularly problematic because the personal consequences can be serious. Western researchers view the avoidance of sensitive topics as the chief problem, but lack of access to information and the limited reliability of information are what make working in genuine freedom in China a major challenge.

8. Does data management meet the required standards?

Data collection, storage and access can entail a range of risks. This may be because the information is politically sensitive, because it has a certain strategic value, or because sharing information can be an issue for third parties. Unauthorised parties may attempt to gain access to such information via any number of entry points. Even sectors that do not seem terribly relevant in terms of content may still be targeted, not least because they often provide indirect access (‘a foot in the door’) to other, more relevant sectors. Besides these substantive matters, technical safeguards (e.g. for data encryption and access protocols) are also important in this connection.

China has a broad interest in usable knowledge ranging from subject knowledge to understanding of policy and strategy. This is not limited to the type of knowledge stored in databases and systems. People often underestimate the value of their own knowledge and position in networks, which increases the risk of divulging or facilitating access to information that should not have been shared. People often fail to notice this risk and/or their own potential involvement. The interviewees in the HCSS/LAC joint study knew very little about the use of big data in research projects in China or whether there are ethics committees that are dealing with this.

Although there is frequent discussion about the potential risks inherent in data management, the joint study did not reveal any actual cases of ‘data poaching’.

Nevertheless, it is evident that pressure is sometimes exerted from the Chinese side in order to get access to information. German studies refer to the great efforts that have to be made in order to be able to evaluate information and data, which sometimes leads to ‘forced technology transfer and one-way knowledge transfer’.⁴⁹ A Dutch university decided to oblige Chinese students to sign non-disclosure agreements to prevent patents being leaked to China.

China itself is very strict about exporting data. All data produced in China must remain in Chinese hands and be stored on Chinese servers.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, it was reported that accessing Chinese data in China presents no major problems.⁵¹ Nevertheless, there are rules stating that authors of dissertations funded by the Chinese state must submit their data to their institute for scrutiny before publication in foreign academic journals.

Finally, it is well known that the Chinese government regularly removes data from the public domain. One illustration of this is the censorship requests it made to the academic publishers Springer and Cambridge University Press: ‘The Chinese government has actively engaged in destroying or hiding data that might be of interest for scientists, and is seeking control of information available to academics’.⁵² However, the HCSS/LAC joint study revealed no specific examples of this.⁵³

9. To what extent can employees or others involved in the partnership be exposed to risks of a political nature?

Researchers and/or students involved in a partnership may be exposed to political risks against their will or without specific intentions. For instance, Chinese researchers may (unintentionally) incur sanctions if they are careless with sensitive information, or conversely be deployed to obtain sensitive information. Dutch and Chinese students may be put at risk through contact with sensitive information, or be monitored by their fellow students. Equally, political pressure can lead to people being excluded from participation in conferences, or invitations to conferences in China can be used as a means of spreading a political message more widely.

The HCSS/LAC joint study presents no specific examples of Chinese researchers who suffered negative personal consequences because of their academic

activities. However, there are certainly indications that the Chinese government is apt to use intimidation to keep its national researchers in line – even abroad.⁵⁴

Students who come into contact with sensitive information may face consequences when they return to China. There is also a known case where a Chinese researcher at a Dutch university came into conflict with a censor and was threatened with the loss of their job and the end of their academic career, should they return to China.⁵⁵ The person in question subsequently went to the United States.

10. Are there commercial interests at stake?

Commercial interests may be at stake, especially in partnerships in areas of research with major technological added value. From the Chinese viewpoint, these interests are never hard to find. This makes it important to identify the commercial risks beforehand, not only in joint projects but also in working with third parties.

Given that China actively pursues a policy of acquiring knowledge that can generate profit, commercial interests are certainly at stake when it comes to applying the results of research in physical science. In the Netherlands, TNO has completely ruled out cooperation with Chinese institutions in this field. However, there is no tangible evidence of academic partnerships with the Netherlands where knowledge, information or data with commercial value have, through improper means, ended up in Chinese hands.

SOME PRACTICAL PRECAUTIONS

Awareness

You can achieve a great deal by raising awareness of the situation. For example, you could introduce a strategy or programme to boost awareness of the vulnerabilities and risks of cooperation with Chinese partners for those involved in it. There are various degrees of vulnerability and risk, so awareness should be raised at the corresponding levels. With strategic partnerships and larger programmes, this means raising awareness at top level in universities and knowledge institutions – including executive and management boards, China programme coordinators and security managers. Chief Information Officers

(CIOs) and staff responsible for the IT infrastructure and digital security also play a crucial role in maintaining the safety and security of information. And at ‘shop-floor level’, individual scientists and researchers need to be appropriately briefed (see below).

Briefing

Scientists, researchers and students going to China should be briefed beforehand about the ways in which they could be approached or influenced. If possible, a debriefing session should also be held after their return, to check whether any potential risks actually materialised and to identify possible patterns. Since there are large numbers of people involved, briefing will usually need to be done in groups. It is vital to impress on participants that their knowledge and networks are highly valuable; for various reasons, these valuable assets should not always be given away. It is vital to emphasise this point, especially since ‘open access’ is increasingly viewed as standard practice. The participating knowledge institutions – as well as government ministries – should take the lead here. A critically important first step is to explicitly indicate which officials are responsible for ‘managing’ the risks – in whatever way. For specific cases with a significant risk potential, contact the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) on their general telephone number.

Use of equipment and information; cyber hygiene

Electronic devices such as laptops and smartphones for use in China should be kept strictly separate from other equipment. You should also assume that all information stored on equipment or servers in China can be viewed by the Chinese government and intelligence services. Good cyber hygiene and customised security by design for your own IT infrastructure can reduce the impact and repercussions of incidents, for instance by compartmentalising access to information.

Collaboration strategy

Does your institution have a broader strategy for collaboration with China? If so, are your objectives for and interests in the proposed partnership in tune with this strategy? In addition, are you well informed about Chinese policy on higher education, knowledge development and international cooperation, and with the Chinese policy agenda for cooperation in the field of the proposed partnership?

Role of the Dutch intelligence services

The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) have both expressed concern about knowledge leaks (especially of strategic knowledge) and abuse of contact networks facilitated by academic cooperation between the Netherlands and China. For a variety of reasons, this applies more emphatically to China than to other countries about which there is concern. Many other Western intelligence services share this concern. In this connection, you should ask the following questions:

- Have you requested information from the AIVD or has the AIVD already given you information about the risks of working with Chinese partners?
- Are you aware that there is a specific/heightened risk:
 - in using particular IT applications in China and social media of Chinese origin (e.g. WeChat) when communicating with Chinese people?
 - in allowing Chinese students and researchers to access Dutch university networks?
 - inherent in Dutch society, with its openness, freedom of communication and relatively limited degree of compartmentalisation, which makes it relatively easy for outsiders to gain access to a critically important sector by an indirect route – in other words via a different, seemingly less related sector?
- Are you aware that the Chinese government can take advantage of partnerships (and actually does so in practice) to ‘recruit’ and/or ‘use’ students, scientists and researchers, consciously or not, and that this is often done in a seemingly routine and straightforward way, such as through LinkedIn? A contact made in this way may lead to a request – in some cases a blatantly candid one – for information, sometimes with the excuse that this cannot be obtained via Chinese internet.
- Are you aware that long-term relations and financial dependence on Chinese funding sources increase vulnerability?

You can reach the AIVD on its general telephone number for more information.

NOTES

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³ Interviews.

⁴ Interviews.

⁵ Willem Schoonen, 'Ook in wetenschap wordt China een wereldmacht', 27 August 2016.

⁶ David Bekkers, 'Sino-Dutch Research: Overview & Opportunities', 6 July 2018.

⁷ Interviews.

⁸ 'China Strategy 2015-2020: Strategic Framework for Cooperation with China in Research, Science and Education', German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 7 December 2015.

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¹⁰ Interviews.

¹¹ Interviews.

¹² Lili Wang and Xianwen Wang, 'Who Sets up the Bridge? Tracking Scientific Collaborations between China and the European Union', *Research Evaluation*, vol. 26, no. 2 (April 2017): pp. 124-31. <https://doi.org/10.1093/reseval/rvx009>.

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¹⁴ 'Strategy for Knowledge-Based Collaboration between Denmark and China', Danish Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation, 2008. https://ufm.dk/en/publications/2008/files-2008/strategy-knowledge-based-collaboration-denmark-china.pdf?set_language=en&cl=en.

¹⁵ Interviews.

¹⁶ Interviews.

¹⁷ Interviews. See also <http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/07/china-cracks-down-after-investigation-finds-massive-peer-review-fraud>.

¹⁸ <https://www.statnews.com/2017/06/23/china-death-penalty-research-fraud/>.

¹⁹ Interviews.

²⁰ 'Western Universities Are Not Prepared for Engaging with China', *Nikkei Asian Review*, 27 December 2017. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Jonathan-Sullivan/Western-universities-are-not-prepared-for-engaging-with-China>. See also <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/china-punishes-us-university-dalai-lama-invitation>.

²¹ Interviews.

²² Interviews.

²³ Interviews.

²⁴ Interviews.

²⁵ Interviews.

²⁶ Interviews.

²⁷ Interviews.

²⁸ Interviews.

²⁹ Interviews.

³⁰ Interviews.

³¹ State Council regulations regarding scientific research, 2018.

³² Interviews.

³³ Christopher Balding, 'The Soft Power of Chinese Censorship' (blog), CPI analysis, 6 November 2017. <https://cpianalysis.org/2017/11/06/the-soft-power-of-chinese-censorship/>;

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/18/the-chinese-communist-party-is-setting-up-cells-at-universities-across-america-china-students-beijing-surveillance/>; interviews.

³⁴ 'China Strategy 2015–2020: Strategic Framework for Cooperation with China in Research, Science and Education', German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2015.

³⁵ 'The New Era: Ready or Not, China Is Here', *The Monthly*, accessed 25 July 2018.

<https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2017/december/1512046800/linda-jaivin/new-era>.

³⁶ See also Yu Zhang, 'CPC members encounter obstacles while trying to establish Party branches overseas', *Global Times*, 28 November 2017.

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⁴¹ Interviews.

⁴² Interviews.

⁴³ See also discussion in <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/18/the-chinese-communist-party-is-setting-up-cells-at-universities-across-america-china-students-beijing-surveillance/>.

⁴⁴ Interviews.

⁴⁵ See <https://www.dub.uu.nl/nl/nieuws/chinese-overheid-houdt-stevige-grip-op-studenten-het-buitenland>.

⁴⁶ Interviews.

⁴⁷ Interviews.

⁴⁸ Ben Andrew Henry, 'The Past and Present of Research Integrity in China', *The Scientist*, 1 March 2017. <https://www.the-scientist.com/careers/the-past-and-present-of-research-integrity-in-china-31933>.

⁴⁹ 'China Strategy 2015-2020: Strategic Framework for Cooperation with China in Research, Science and Education', German Federal Ministry of Education and Research', 7 December 2015.

⁵⁰ Interviews. See also <http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/04/china-asserts-firm-grip-research-data>.

⁵¹ Interviews.

⁵² Christopher Balding, 'The Soft Power of Chinese Censorship' (blog), CPI analysis, 6 November 2017. <https://cpianalysis.org/2017/11/06/the-soft-power-of-chinese-censorship/>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Interviews.

⁵⁵ Interviews.